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ABSTRACT 
 
This study examines the relationship between the corporate governance mechanisms 
related to the ownership structure, board of directors, audit committee and auditor quality 
along with company attributes and the accounting conservatism of Jordanian listed 
companies. The theoretical foundation of such a relationship was provided by five 
comprehensive theories which are the agency theory, the positive accounting theory, the 
resource dependence theory, stewardship and the signaling theory. The data were 
obtained from the annual reports of 348 Jordanian companies from 2009 to 2011. Upon 
using the multiple regression analysis, the results show that the relationship between the 
corporate governance mechanisms and accounting conservatism was somewhat varied. 
Fifteen hypotheses were developed in this study. Seven of them were significant while 
eight were not. For ownership structure, institutional and foreign ownership were 
significant while family and managerial ownership were not statistically significant. 
Board independence, financial expertise and board tenure were significant, while board 
size, CEO and multiple directorships were not significant due to the higher level of P-
value compared to 0.05. On the other hand, audit committee and auditor independence 
were statistically significant to conservatism, while auditor brand name, company size 
and debt contract were reported to be negatively and not significantly related to 
conservatism. These results indicate that corporate governance plays a vital role in 
enhancing the level of conservatism and reducing agency conflict. Further, regulator 
bodies in Jordan should increase the effectiveness of corporate governance in Jordanian 
companies in order to enhance the quality of financial reports. In addition, this study 
opens up avenues for more studies on accounting conservatism not only in Jordan, but 
also in other countries where this area of study is lacking. Furthermore, it opens up 
opportunities and provides avenues for more in-depth research related to the quality of 
financial reports. 
Keywords: corporate governance, accounting conservatism, board of directors, accrual-
based, Jordan 
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ABSTRAK 
 
Kajian ini mengkaji hubungan antara mekanisme tadbir urus korporat yang berkaitan 
dengan struktur pemilikan, lembaga pengarah, jawatankuasa audit dan kualiti juruaudit 
serta atribut  syarikat dan konservatisme perakaunan syarikat-syarikat yang tersenarai di 
Jordan. Asas teori dalam perhubungan tersebut telah disediakan berdasarkan lima teori 
yang komprehensif iaitu teori agensi, teori perakaunan positif, teori pergantungan 
sumber, dan teori pengawasan dan pengisyaratan. Data diperolehi daripada laporan 
tahunan 348 buah syarikat di Jordan  dalam  tempoh 2009-2011. Dalam analisis regresi 
berganda, keputusan menunjukkan bahawa hubungan di antara mekanisme tadbir urus 
korporat dan konservatisme perakaunan adalah agak berbeza-beza. Lima belas hipotesis 
telah dibangunkan dalam kajian ini. Tujuh daripadanya adalah signifikan  manakala lapan 
lagi didapati tidak signifikan. Bagi struktur pemilikan, pemilikan institusi dan pemilikan 
asing adalah signifikan manakala pemilikan  keluarga dan pemilikan pengurusan didapati 
tidak signifikan secara statistik. Kebebasan lembaga pengarah, kepakaran kewangan dan 
tempoh lantikan lembaga pengarah adalah signifikan  manakala saiz lembaga pengarah, 
Ketua Pegawai Eksekutif  dan kepelbagaian jawatan pengarah didapati tidak signifikan  
kerana nilai P berada pada tahap yang lebih tinggi berbanding 0.05. Sebaliknya, 
jawatankuasa audit dan kebebasan juruaudit secara statistiknya signifikan kepada 
konservatisme, manakala penjenamaan juruaudit, saiz syarikat dan kontrak hutang 
dilaporkan negatif dan tidak signifikan dengan konservatisme. Keputusan ini 
menunjukkan bahawa tadbir urus korporat memainkan peranan penting dalam 
meningkatkan tahap konservatisme dan mengurangkan konflik agensi. Tambahan lagi, 
badan-badan pengawal selia di Jordan perlu meningkatkan keberkesanan tadbir urus 
korporat dalam syarikat-syarikat di negara tersebut  bagi meningkatkan kualiti laporan 
kewangan. Di samping itu, kajian ini membuka ruang kepada lebih banyak kajian tentang 
konservatisme perakaunan bukan sahaja di Jordan, tetapi juga di negara-negara lain yang 
kekurangan kajian dalam bidang ini. Tambahan pula, kajian ini membuka peluang dan  
menyediakan ruang bagi penyelidikan yang lebih mendalam berkaitan kualiti laporan 
kewangan. 
Kata kunci: tadbir urus korporat, konservatisme perakaunan, lembaga pengarah, asas 
keakruan, Jordan 
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1 
 
CHAPTER ONE 
INTRODUCTION 
 
1.0 Background of Study 
 
Accounting conservatism is considered as the most effective principle underpinning 
accounting valuation and has a lengthy historical application to financial accounting 
exceeding, five centuries (Basu, 1997; Sterling, 1970). Nonetheless, the concept of 
conservatism faces significant criticism by academics, capital market regulators and 
standards-setters. Critics such as LaFond and Watts (2008) argued that conservatism 
leads to understate of net assets in the present period leading to overstate of earnings in 
the future periods due to the understate of future expenses. Despite heavy criticism, 
previous empirical studies reported that conservatism has increased during the past 
decades (Givoly & Hay, 2002; Lobo & Zhou, 2006). This suggests critics may overlook 
major benefits of conservatism. The lengthy persistence and resilience to criticism of 
accounting conservatism are intriguing empirical impasses producing a number of 
significant unanswered questions. 
 
Previous studies have defined conservatism by the aphorism “anticipate no profit, but 
anticipates all losses” (Watts, 2003a). Basu (1997) defined accounting conservatism as 
earnings asymmetric timeliness that requires high level of verification for recognizing of 
good news as an economic profit than recognizing bad news as an economic loss. Givoly 
and Hayn (2000) defined accounting conservatism as a choice between the principles of 
accounting that lead to decrease the cumulative earnings by slower recognition of 
The contents of 
the thesis is for 
internal user 
only 
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Definitions for the Abbreviations of the Initial Model 
 
Symbol Variables Description and 
Measurement 
Predicted 
Direction 
Relevant 
Hypotheses 
 Dependent Variable    
ACCR Accounting 
Conservatism  
ACCR= [(income +depreciation 
expenses– operating cash 
flows)]  ÷Total assets.  
ACCR = (Accruals / 3 years) X 
(-1). 
 
 
 
Symbol Variables Description and 
Measurement 
Predicted 
Direction 
Relevant 
Hypotheses 
 Ownership 
Structure 
   
OWINST Institutional 
Ownership 
Institutional ownership 
measured as ratio, “by dividing 
the number of shares held by 
the institutions to the total 
number of firm's shares. 
+ H1a 
OWFOREI Foreign Ownership Foreign ownership measured as 
the percentage of shares held by 
foreigners to total number of 
firm's shares. 
+ H1b 
OWFAM Family Ownership Family ownership measured as 
the percentage of shares held by 
families to total number of 
firm's shares. 
+ H1c 
OWMAN Managerial 
Ownership 
Managerial ownership 
calculated as the percentage of 
shares held by directors on the 
board to the total number of 
firm's shares. 
_ H1d 
BIND Independence Board independence measured 
proportion of independent 
directors to total directors on 
board. 
 
+ 
 
H2a 
BSIZ Size Board size is the natural 
logarithm of total number of 
board members. 
+ H2b 
BCEO  CEO Duality Dummy variable = 1 if 
CEO/Chairman roles combine;0 
if separate. 
+ H2c 
BFIX Financial Expertise Percentage of board members 
with financial expertise to total 
directors on board. 
+ H2d 
BTEN Tenure Average years the independent 
directors served on the firm‟s 
board. 
+ H2e 
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Symbol Variables Description and 
Measurement 
Predicted 
Direction 
Relevant 
Hypotheses 
BMULT Multiple 
Directorships 
Percentage of board members 
with more than two outside 
directorships to total directors 
on board. 
+ H2f 
 Audit Committee Dummy variable = 1 if 
company has audit committee 
and 0 otherwise. 
+ H3 
ACIND Audit committee  
independence 
The proportion  of  independent  
members in the audit committee 
  
ACFE Financial  expertise The total number of audit 
committee Members with 
financial expertise divided by 
the total number of audit 
committee members. 
  
 
ACD 
 
Diligence 
 
Diligence, awarding a score of 
1 if the audit committee meets 
at least four times or more in 
financial year; and 0 otherwise 
  
 Auditor Quality    
AUIND Independence Measured by non-audit fee/total 
fee ratio. 
 
+ H4a 
AUBRAN Brand Name Dummy variable = 1 if the 
external auditor engaged by Big 
4 firm, and 0 otherwise. 
 
+ H4b 
 Company Attributes    
CSIZE Size Company size measured by log 
of total assets. 
 
+ H5a 
CDEBT Debt Contract Noncurrent liabilities/total 
assets. 
+ H5b 
 
 
